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Abstract  Are theories ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in any way that should worry 
the scientific realist?  I argue that no convincing reason has been given for thinking so.  A 
crucial distinction is drawn between data equivalence and empirical equivalence. Duhem 
showed that it is always possible to produce a data equivalent rival to any accepted scientific 
theory. But there is no reason to regard such a rival as equally well empirically supported and 
hence no threat to realism. Two theories are empirically equivalent if they share all 
consequences expressed in purely observational vocabulary. This is a much stronger 
requirement than has hitherto been recognised – two such ‘rival’ theories must in fact agree 
on many claims that are clearly theoretical in nature.  Given this, it is unclear how much of an 
impact on realism a demonstration that there is always an empirically equivalent ‘rival’ to any 
accepted theory would have – even if such a demonstration could be produced. Certainly in 
the case of the version of realism that I defend – structural realism – such a demonstration 
would have precisely no impact: two empirically equivalent theories are, according to 
structural realism, cognitively indistinguishable. 
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1. Introduction: the ‘threat’ to realism from underdetermination 
 
It seems to be widely supposed that if scientific theories could be shown to be ‘systematically 
underdetermined’ by the evidence, then scientific realism would be in dire trouble. Why? 
 
The appeal of scientific realism is chiefly based on the – staggering – empirical success of the 
theories currently accepted in science. The realist exhibits some currently accepted scientific 
theory (the General Theory of Relativity, say), points to its astounding empirical success 
(with the gravitational redshift, the precession of Mercury’s perihelion, etc) and suggests that 
it would be monumentally implausible to suppose that the theory could score such empirical 
successes and yet not reflect, at least to some good approximation, the underlying nature of 
reality. To hold that combination of beliefs would be, in Poincaré’s celebrated phrase 
(1905/1952, p. 150), “to attribute an inadmissible role to chance”. 
 
In order, then, to produce a potential threat to scientific realism, theories would have to be 
shown to be ‘underdetermined by the evidence’ in a seemingly quite specific sense. It would 
have to be shown that no matter how empirically successful a given accepted theory T may 
have been, rivals T′ to T can always be constructed that are equally empirically successful, but 
that make claims quite different from those of T about the ‘deep structure’ of the universe.  If 
(but only if) theories could be shown to be underdetermined in this sense, then the realist 
would indeed seem to be in some trouble.  This is because, in that case, the realist presumably 
ought to regard any such T′ as ‘equally good’ as T in the light of the evidence, and therefore 
to stand equally ready to run her argument in favour of that rival. But this time the argument 
would conclude that it is monumentally implausible that the claims of T′ about ‘deep 
  
3
structure’ are off-beam, given its empirical success. But T and T′ are, by supposition, rivals 
and cannot therefore both be true. Underdetermination in this sense (if established) threatens 
to reduce ‘the master argument’ for scientific realism to absurdity.   
 
This understanding of ‘underdetermination’, although more specific than some, is not in fact 
as specific as might initially appear: it is by no means clear exactly what it takes for a rival T′ 
to some accepted theory T to ‘share T’s empirical success’ and therefore to count as ‘equally 
good’ for the realist.  Indeed clarification of this notion will form a central part of the current 
paper. (It is the topic of sections 3 and 4.) No sensible realist ought to accept a demonstration 
that two theories deductively entail the same data as showing that those two theories ‘share 
the same empirical success’; and therefore that both are equally good candidates for her No 
Miracles ‘Argument’.  The chief reason for this is of course that mere accommodation of 
some piece of evidence e within a theoretical framework does not count as a genuine 
empirical success in the way that a real prediction of that piece of evidence does. (See again 
section 3.)   
 
There is however a prior question.  Independently of what ‘sharing the same empirical 
success’ really means (or should mean), suppose that there is a scientific realist who as a 
matter of fact accepts that there are some particular pairs of contradictory theories T and T′ 
that do indeed share the same empirical success and therefore are ‘equally good’ candidates 
for feeding into the No Miracles ‘Argument’.   Is it as obvious as the above argument might 
make it seem that such a realist would be in trouble? 
 
 
2. What would it take to hurt realism?1 
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Would a realist inevitably be disconcerted, as the argument sketched in the previous section 
suggests she would, by a demonstration that the choice between two or more fundamental 
theories is genuinely underdetermined by the data – a demonstration that each is, in whatever 
way she may understand the phrase, ‘equally good’ in the light of all the data? 
 
Assuming that the two theories at issue are correctly considered as genuine rivals (and this 
would itself clearly need investigation in particular circumstances), then a very naïve realist 
would indeed be in trouble.  Let’s call such a philosopher a ‘gung ho realist’.  The gung ho 
realist holds that the rational position is always to believe in the truth of our accepted, 
empirically successful theories. And two rival, and therefore mutually contradictory, theories 
cannot, of course, both be true.  However, quite independently of any consideration of 
‘underdetermination’, no one should be a gung ho realist about any (let alone every) theory 
‘accepted’ by science. 
 
 ‘Accepted’ of course means ‘accepted as the currently best available’, and a theory may 
certainly be the best available, and impressively predictively successful, while having 
problematic aspects.  Kepler, Galileo and Newton, for example, all accepted (that is they were 
all realist about) the basic Copernican theory on the grounds of its predictive success (for 
example with planetary stations and retrogressions) but were not realist about, for example, 
Copernicus’s ‘third motion’ (a conjectured conical motion of the earth’s axis). This was 
because that ‘third motion’ was introduced by Copernicus entirely ad hoc to solve a problem 
of the theory’s own creation. (Because Copernicus still believed that the planets, and therefore 
in particular the earth, were fixed in crystalline spheres whose motions carried them round the 
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sun, his theory had a problem explaining the constant angle of inclination of the earth’s axis 
relative to the sun.)2  
 
Or take current science: no one should (as is widely recognised) be a gung ho realist about the 
two most powerful theories in contemporary physics – the General Theory of Relativity and 
the Quantum theory. GTR and QM are arguably not outright inconsistent but they are 
mutually incoherent – scientists often say ‘incompatible’: very roughly, QM says everything 
is quantized, spacetime, according to GTR, isn’t; while GTR says all laws are covariant, but 
QM is not a covariant theory. (And of course the ‘measurement problem’ supplies a quite 
independent reason for being sceptical about a gung ho realist interpretation of QM.) QM and 
GTR do not perhaps present even a presumptive case of ‘underdetermination’ in any regular 
sense since they are not directly two rival theories based on the same range of data.  
Nonetheless they are two ill-fitting theories when we would like to have one unified theory.3 
 
But if no one seriously believes that QM and GTR are both strictly true, everyone accepts that 
they are amongst the most impressively empirically successful theories ever.  It seems 
reasonable to believe therefore (or so the sensible realist will insist) that there is something 
about the overall theories (and not just their directly checkable empirical parts) that reflects 
the ‘deep structure’ of the universe; but this doesn’t mean they are outright true, only that they 
will both live on as approximations to some future ‘synthesis’. (This is exactly why physicists 
often talk of the search for a synthesis of the two rather than outright replacements for them.) 
Similarly Newton, as just remarked, was realist about Copernican theory – believing it had 
latched on to the underlying truth in some basic way, while at the same time seeking actively 
to modify it in important respects (that is, while clearly not believing it to be outright true).4 
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The sophisticated realist therefore claims not that belief in the truth of our best theories is 
rational but ‘only’ that belief in their approximate truth is. The fact that it is only this weaker 
claim that can seriously be endorsed is of course further underlined by the history of theory-
change in science that forms the basis of the so-called pessimistic meta-induction.  Pessimistic 
meta-inducers claim to supply a whole list of previously accepted theories, in the most 
threatening version of the argument predictively successful theories, that were eventually 
replaced by theories inconsistent with them.5  No one can seriously argue that our currently 
accepted theories are definitely immune to similar replacement in the future by theories that 
are inconsistent with them.6  The only plausible view, then, is that currently accepted theories 
are likely to prove ‘merely’ approximately true in the same sense as those earlier and now 
rejected theories count as approximately true from the vantage point of the current theories. 
 
Moreover, as the case of Newton’s attitude toward Copernican theory indicates, one can be 
realist about a theory without even expecting that all of it will be preserved as a limiting case 
in future theories. There is nothing in Newton’s modification of Copernicus corresponding to 
the latter’s ‘third motion’ of the earth. But this doesn’t mean that it was unreasonable to have 
a realist view of the theory overall.7 
 
The important point, then, is that while two mutually inconsistent theories cannot of course 
both be true, they may both be approximately true -  that is, both may emerge as (of course 
different) limiting cases of some further, superior theory,  just as current physicists expect 
GTR and QM both to emerge as limiting cases from the eventual ‘synthesis’.  Given this fact, 
the apparent threat to realism from underdetermination becomes harder to specify.  
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Once sophistication is allowed, then, first, it becomes clear that the realist need not be 
troubled by particular instances of ‘underdetermination’ since she may, despite their rivalry, 
have a (reasonable) realist attitude to each of the theories left underdetermined by the data. 
Moreover, the sophisticated realist certainly is not troubled at all by some of the cases that 
have sometimes been cited against her.  Consider the example made much of by van Fraassen 
amongst others: the case of Newton’s ‘hypothesis’ that the centre of mass of the universe is at 
rest in absolute space.8  Here there is a specific readily identifiable ‘underdetermination’ – a 
parameter λ can provably be adjusted at will without any loss of either empirical power or 
theoretical unity. This means that there is an infinity of different equally empirically powerful 
theories T(λ) for a range of values of  λ. Newton himself, while recommending the 
‘hypothesis’ that λ = 0, demonstrated that all the appearances would be the same (and, 
importantly, the unity of the overall theory – of mechanics plus universal gravitation -  would 
be retained) if that centre of mass had any uniform velocity relative to absolute space other 
than zero.  In such a case the sensible, sophisticated realist surely says that (provided that, as 
here, any T(λ) is predictively successful), there is something about that range of theories that 
accurately reflects the ‘deep structure’ of the universe, but not with respect to the parameter λ 
– about whose precise value there is no scientifically justified view. Newton’s demonstration 
that any uniform velocity of the centre of mass would do just as well as the assumption of 
absolute rest leaves the sensible realist, being realist about the overall theory, but sceptical 
about any precise value of that velocity, and perhaps about the whole notion of an absolute 
velocity.  The acknowledged underdetermination here does not challenge scientific realism. 
Newton’s theory scored stunning successes, both early (with, for example, the precession of 
the equinoxes) and late (with, for example, the prediction and discovery of the existence of 
Neptune). It is therefore reasonable to think, insists the realist, that there is something ‘right’ 
about the overall structure of the theory; but Newton’s own demonstration shows that this 
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‘something’ need not include the assumption he endorsed concerning the absolute velocity of 
the centre of mass of the whole system. 
 
The conclusion of this section, then, is that for an underdetermination result to be truly 
threatening to the scientific realist, it would have to be much stronger than is often 
recognised.  Not only must it be shown that (i) for any accepted scientific theory there is 
always another that is ‘equally empirically successful’; it must also be shown (ii) that the 
alternative cannot plausibly be regarded as equally ‘approximately true’ as the accepted 
theory.  
 
As we will see in the next section, it is easy to show (on lines laid down already by Duhem) 
that on a very weak construal of what it takes for two theories to be ‘equally empirically 
successful’, condition (i) can readily be established. On that weak construal, alternatives to 
accepted theories can readily be constructed for which the realist could not plausibly deny 
condition (ii) – that is, where the realist could not plausibly claim that the ‘equally successful’ 
rival was in fact equally approximately true as the accepted theory. But again the 
sophisticated realist is in no real trouble: the notion of ‘equally empirically successful’ used to 
‘demonstrate’ (i) is obviously inadequate.  
 
  
3. Empirical Success  and ‘Data equivalence’ 
 
It might naively be thought that a rival T′ ‘shares T’s empirical success’ if (and only if) for 
every empirical prediction e made by T, T′ also entails e. More precisely, I mean by the 
condition on the right hand side here not that every consequence expressible in empirical 
  
9
terms of one theory is also a consequence of the other, but rather only that every directly 
checkable observation result (about apparent planetary positions, the outcome of some 
experiment such as the two slit experiment in optics, etc) entailed by T is also entailed by T′.  
(These are – very – significantly different notions as we will see in the next section.) Let us 
call this condition, as I intend it, data equivalence.   
 
So the proposition that we are now considering is that two theories ‘share the same empirical 
success’ or are ‘equally well supported by the evidence’ (and hence the same realist case can 
be made for both of them) exactly if the two theories are data equivalent.  It is however one of 
the major lessons of the past 40-odd years of philosophy of science (and indeed one that ought 
already to have been clear from Duhem’s Aim and Structure (1906/1954), if not still earlier) 
that this proposition is untenable. 
 
First, we need to be clear about exactly which theoretical units are being considered. As 
Duhem pointed out (op. cit, Part II, chapter 6), assertions of the sort that we tend to think of as 
‘single’ theories – Newton’s theory (of mechanics plus universal gravitation), the wave theory 
of light, etc – entail no empirically checkable results at all when considered ‘in isolation’: that 
is, without ‘auxiliary’ assumptions.  Hence if we are considering such ‘single theories’, there 
is of course no problem in producing for any accepted theory a rival that is data equivalent to 
it. The negation of the accepted theory will do: so, for example, Newton’s theory and its 
negation are of course rivals and they are trivially data equivalent since neither entails any 
datum.   
 
Additionally, as Duhem also pointed out (ibid), many ‘single’ theories such as ‘the wave 
theory of light’ (say, to be specific, that developed by Fresnel by 1823) themselves break 
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down naturally into a central or core theory – in this case the assertion that light consists of 
periodic vibrations transmitted through some sort of  medium – together with more specific 
assumptions: about the mechanical characteristics of the medium, the types of wave 
corresponding to light of different colours and so on.  It is this that allows for coherent talk 
about ‘a’ theory ‘evolving’ over time: in response to empirical and conceptual difficulties 
wave theorists rejected some specific assumptions and replaced them by others, while of 
course retaining the core theory that identified them as wave theorists.  
 
Even once some particular set of specific assumptions for such a theory has (temporarily) 
been fixed, however, further auxiliary assumptions are still required before any datum can 
validly be deduced. It seems natural then to characterise the resulting ‘theory’ consisting in 
general of core, specific and auxiliary assumptions as in fact a theoretical system. 
 
So theoretical systems, unlike ‘core’ or ‘single’ theories, do entail directly checkable 
observation results. And the upshot of Duhem’s analysis was, of course, that rival theoretical 
systems based on rival ‘core’ theories can always be made data equivalent.  Suppose we have 
two rival ‘core’ or ‘central’ theories C1 and C2 (the basic wave theory of light versus the basic 
corpuscular theory (light consists of material particles of some sort/s), for example, or 
Newton’s theory versus the special theory of relativity).  For any given set of data E, there 
must always be some sets of auxiliaries A1 and A2 which when added  to C1 and C2,  
respectively, will produce rival theoretical systems T1 and T2 both of which entail E. (So, for 
example, C1 → E and C2 → E would do for A1 and A2  respectively.)  
 
Of course there is, and can be, no guarantee that data equivalence will be preserved once the 
stock of data is expanded, via the discovery of some new datum e, into the set E′. It might turn 
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out that only one (or perhaps neither) of the systems T1 and T2 entails e and therefore E′. 
Suppose that T1 does entail e (and hence E′) but T2 does not. However, Duhem’s point applies 
again to show that, by of course now invoking different auxiliaries, a framework T2′ based on 
the same core (C2) can be constructed such that T1 and T2′ are again data equivalent. 
 
Equally clearly, and very significantly for this debate, ‘data equivalent’ does not entail 
‘equally empirically supported’.  Any number of accounts of the confirmation of theory by 
evidence, starting with hints in Duhem and including my own detailed account9, entail a 
crucial difference between prediction and accommodation.  
 
‘Prediction’, as I have argued following Lakatos and Zahar,10 has, when properly understood, 
no (necessary) temporal connotations – whether or not the evidence was known before a 
theory was discovered to entail it is, by itself, irrelevant. Prediction properly understood is 
simply the opposite of accommodation. A piece of evidence e is accommodated within a 
theoretical system T based on a core theory C by tailoring specific and/or auxiliary 
assumptions exactly so as to produce such a system that entails e.  A datum e′ is predicted by 
a theoretical system just in case it is deductively entailed by that system but was not 
accommodated within it. 
 
A classic case of accommodation is that of the ‘fossil’ evidence within the framework of 
‘special creation’ by using what I sometimes call the ‘Gosse dodge’. This was invented by 
Philip Gosse in his book Omphalos. There seem to be the impressions of the skeletons of 
previously existing but now extinct species in certain rocks, and fossilised bones of such 
creatures underground in bits of earth -  which, had those creatures really existed, would have 
(long) predated 4004BC. No problem, said Gosse: God obviously chose, when creating the 
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whole universe in 4004 BC, to make those particular rocks or those particular pieces of earth 
with that ‘engraving’ or that bone-like ‘fossilised’ structure already in them. 
 
Another classic case is the accommodation by Ptolemy of the evidence of planetary stations 
and retrogressions within theoretical systems based on the core claim of a fixed and central 
earth.  The planets as observed from the earth seem to have a combined motion consisting of 
two components – a westward diurnal rotation with the fixed stars and a generally eastward 
motion against the fixed stars. However that second ‘proper’ motion of the planet is 
periodically interrupted by its gradually coming to a halt (station) – so that it now 
instantaneously has exactly the same diurnal rotation as the stars – and ‘retrogressing’ for a 
while against the background of the fixed stars before again halting and then assuming its 
more normal eastward motion.  This phenomenon is straightforwardly accounted for 
(predicted! – even though the phenomenon had been known for centuries before Copernicus) 
by the basic Copernican model.  The planets have their own regular orbit; but we observe 
them from our moving observatory on earth. The stations and retrogressions are the (merely 
apparent and inevitable) results of the earth either overtaking (the superior) or being overtaken 
by (the inferior) planets: during the overtaking the planet (when viewed against the 
background of the fixed stars) will automatically appear from our moving observatory on 
Earth to retrogress. On the other hand, in order to produce a theoretical framework based on 
the geostatic core that dealt with stations and retrogressions, Ptolemy, as is well known, had 
to introduce a special device – the epicycle –and the relative velocities of the epicyclic and 
deferent rotations had to be adjusted precisely in the light of the known observations.11   
 
In both the Darwin vs Creationism and Copernicus vs Ptolemy cases, the two theories, or 
rather latest theoretical systems based on them, end up as data equivalent. (And indeed in the 
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second case the two theories were demonstrably data equivalent relative to all the data known 
at the time of the publication of De Revolutionibus.)  But it is surely clear that any serious 
account of empirical support will need to entail a difference in the empirical support leant to 
Darwin and Creationism by the ‘fossils’, and in the empirical support leant to Copernicus and 
Ptolemy by the observation of planetary stations and retrogressions.  
 
Some accounts invoke simplicity to underwrite the accommodation/prediction distinction – 
both Copernicus and Ptolemy entail the correct data concerning stations and retrogressions 
and that is all one can require empirically, but Copernican theory is the simpler. However 
even sticking to the intuitive level (it has of course proved notoriously difficult to characterise 
simplicity formally), it seems clear that this is to underrate the role of the phenomena, which 
drop out of Copernicus in a completely natural way, but which force the complexity in 
Ptolemy. The accurate judgement – delivered by the account of confirmation I endorse (op. 
cit.) – is that, despite the fact that fossils are accounted for both by Darwin and by 
Creationism and planetary stations and retrogressions follow from theoretical systems built 
around the two rival core claims of helio- and geo-centrism, the phenomena in both cases give 
more empirical support to (and hence supply an empirical reason to prefer) the first theories in 
these pairs.. 
 
Hence, returning to the vague notion of ‘sharing empirical success’ that I started from, it is 
not true on this account of confirmation (or indeed on any that seems halfway adequate) that 
the fact that two theories (or rather theoretical systems) are data equivalent entails that those 
two systems (and more pertinently) their respective core theories ‘share the same empirical 
success’.   
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The Duhemian way into ‘underdetermination’ seems to be the only one that really arises 
historically in cases of theory-change. Or at least it is the only such way that can be invoked 
generally across all theories.  Kuhn’s account and in particular his claims about ‘elderly hold-
outs’ for what turns out to be an older paradigm in a revolution are in essence just (rather 
confusing) paraphrases of Duhem’s analysis.12 And, as we just saw, this Duhemian way does 
not underwrite any notion of underdetermination that should trouble the realist. Such a realist 
certainly does not want to adopt the sort of realist attitude suggested in section 2 toward, say, 
both Darwinism and Creationism, both Copernicus and Ptolemy; but there is no argument to 
suggest that she is obliged to do so. Independently of any consideration about realism, the fact 
that data equivalent theoretical systems can be produced based on either the first or second of 
either of these two pairs of core theory does not commit the realist to holding that both 
theories in either pair are equally empirically successful (even with respect to the range of 
phenomena to which they have so far been shown to data equivalent). And hence there is no 
suggestion that the No Miracles ‘Argument’, if it applies at all, should apply to both theories 
equally. 
 
And indeed the point is strongly underwritten exactly by concentrating on that argument.  
There is at least some intuitive bite to the idea that it is, for example, implausible that 
Copernican theory could get the phenomena of planetary stations and retrogressions correct as 
directly as it does unless it has latched on, at least approximately, to the ‘way things really 
are’. But we know the explanation for Ptolemy’s ‘success’ with those same phenomena; and it 
has nothing to do with the world, but rather with the ingenuity of Ptolemaic astronomers in 
solving the problem of engineering post hoc a geostatic accommodation of the already known 
phenomena – a problem for which, as Duhem’s analysis assures us in advance, there must be 
any number of solutions. 
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4. Data equivalence and Empirical Equivalence 
 
I argued in section 2 that in order to trouble the scientific realist an underdetermination 
argument would have to establish not only (i) for any accepted scientific theory there is 
always another that is ‘equally empirically successful’ but also (ii) that there is some reason 
why the realist could not reasonably regard the alternative as ‘approximately true’ just like the 
accepted theory. In section 3 I argued that the standard Duhem way into ‘underdetermination’ 
(the only one that seems really to arise in the development of science as a general issue) fails 
even to establish condition (i).  That argument was based on the claim (fact!) that it is mistake 
to equate ‘equal empirical success’ with ‘data equivalence’.  Is there some other explication of 
the notion of ‘equal empirical success’ that might form the basis for a genuine challenge to 
scientific realism from ‘underdetermination’? 
 
In a much-discussed (1991) paper, Laudan and Leplin have already presented an argument to 
the effect that underdetermination is less troubling for the realist than might meet the eye. 
And that argument bears at least some superficial similarities to the one being developed here.  
Laudan and Leplin’s argument proceeds as follows. First they identify what they explicitly 
take to be the ‘traditional’ notion of empirical equivalence. Secondly, they argue (a) that there 
is in fact no general guarantee that for any given theory we can always construct empirically 
equivalent rivals and (b) that even if there are some cases where empirically equivalent rivals 
can be produced, it would be a mistake to infer automatically that those rivals are equally 
empirically successful or equally well supported by the evidence. 
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There are problems with Laudan and Leplin’s argument for (a) – some pointed out in the 
subsequent literature (e.g. Okasha 1997); and, as for (b), while this may seem superficially to 
be related to the argument in the previous section, their own version of it is in fact very 
different (and very problematic) as we shall now see. 
 
Laudan and Leplin’s characterisation of empirical equivalence (which, as just remarked, they 
take – perhaps with some justification - to be ‘traditional’ in the literature) is as follows.  
First, divide the vocabulary of the common language within which any two theories T and T′ 
are expressed into the purely empirical (or observational) vocabulary and the theoretical 
vocabulary.  T and T′ are, then, empirically equivalent just in case the sets of their deductive 
consequences that are expressible purely in the observational vocabulary are identical.13 ( I 
take it here that purely logical and mathematical vocabulary is shared: we want to say, for 
example, that ‘there are 2 planets in that portion of the sky’ is in the observation language, 
while ‘there were two electrons in that section of the bubble chamber’ is in the theoretical 
language.) 
 
It might be thought (and it seems hitherto to have been assumed in the literature) that this 
notion of empirical equivalence is itself equivalent to the notion of data equivalence 
introduced earlier. However this is far from being the case.   
 
We saw in section 3 that Ptolemaic theory and Copernican theory are data equivalent relative 
to the (apparent) motions of the sun, fixed stars and planets known at the time of De 
Revolutionibus; and that Darwinian theory and ‘Gossefied Creationism’ are data equivalent 
with respect to the fossil record.  But, contrary perhaps to immediate impressions, this by no 
means entails that Ptolemy and Copernicus or Darwin and Creationism are (or, rather, can be 
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made to be – that is, can be embedded within suitable theoretical systems that are) empirically 
equivalent in Laudan and Leplin’s sense. Nor is this to do with the possibility (of course 
actualised in both these cases) of extensions of the data sets.   
 
This is especially clear in the case of the second pair of theories.  Darwinian theory (D) and 
Gossefied creationism (G) (relative, remember, just to the ‘fossils’) yield all the same data, 
but there are any number of statements that are in purely observational vocabulary over which 
they differ. For example, G entails that no observable element of the universe has existed for 
more than approximately 6000 years – this is expressed purely in observational language (I 
assume) and yet is at odds with D. Notice then that this is definitely not a question of two 
theories that are ‘equivalent’ with respect to one set of data, becoming non-equivalent when 
that data set is extended through new types of result. With respect to this dispute, the claim 
that nothing is older than 6000 years old can never be a datum – it is an observational claim 
that is subject to theoretical dispute. 
 
One reaction to this, exploiting the vagueness of the ordinary usage of ‘observational’, would 
be to deny that statements about an object’s age can count as observational: only statements 
about an object’s ‘apparent age’ can count.  And of course the two theories D and G agree 
that there are lots of denizens of the universe whose apparent ages are more than 6000 years.  
But this simply complicates the situation without affecting the point: the assertion that there 
was a time (roughly 4004BC) before which none of the current constituents of the ‘material’ 
universe had an apparent age (because nothing, except presumably God, existed) is (i) 
unambiguously in the observation language even on this more demanding construal; (ii) 
entailed by G; and (iii) contradicted by D (which of course identifies apparent and real ages).  
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Even aside from particular examples, the fact that there are many claims that are expressed 
purely in observational vocabulary but that ought to count as theoretical in anyone’s book 
should hardly come as a surprise. A much used example14 is the assertion that there are 
unobservable objects – i.e. objects with no (directly) observable property.  Carl Hempel in his 
famous paper 'The Theoretician's Dilemma' (1958 [1965]) provided the following further 
example (p. 197): 
 
“Let Sx,y,z hold iff x is farther away from y than from z, then   
Pa ≡  ∃x∀y [¬(x = y) → Sa,x,y] states that there is an object such that a is further 
away from that object than it is from any other object.” 
 
Pa is clearly an expression of the observation language on any reasonable construal and yet, 
as Hempel points out, it surely counts as theoretical: since no finite set of observation 
statements can either verify or refute it.  
 
This second example in particular underwrites the important point (much emphasised also by 
Popper) that whether or not a sentence counts as a theory is not just a question of the 
vocabulary in which it is expressed but also of its quantificational structure.15  
 
These general facts indicate that the failure of full empirical equivalence for pairs of data 
equivalent theories is not an accidental feature of the particular examples I have cited (nor of 
others that are often cited such as Reichenbach’s flat space plus universal forces versus the 
General Theory of Relativity). Any theory has consequences that are (i) expressible in the 
observation language and yet (ii) cannot be decided on the basis of observation or experiment 
but (iii) rival theories deny. This seems clearly to categorize such consequences as 
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observationally expressed theoretical statements. Genuinely rival theories, even if they can be 
made data equivalent, will (by (iii)) continue to conflict over a range of such statements and 
hence will automatically fail to be empirically equivalent in Laudan and Leplin’s sense. Take 
the classical wave theory of light, for example. It entails that there is some medium with no 
directly observable properties which plays a role (mathematically specifiable) in optical 
effects. This claim is purely in the observation language, and the corpuscular theory 
contradicts it.16  
 
Hence two theories that are really empirically equivalent in Laudan and Leplin’s ‘traditional’ 
sense will in particular have to be equivalent with respect to a range of theoretical assertions – 
those theoretical assertions expressible in purely observational vocabulary. Hence any two 
‘rival’ theories that are empirically equivalent in this (as it now transpires very strong) sense 
will at least have to agree, not only about the data, but also over a wide range of claims that 
everyone should take to be theoretical. Once again the threat that is posed to realism by 
underdetermination becomes altogether less clear cut than it at first appears. 
 
Certainly for the form of realism that I advocate – namely structural realism17 - any 
demonstration that for any accepted theory there is another that is empirically equivalent to it 
would pose no problem at all.  This is because structural realism entails that any two such 
theories are, by virtue of their empirical equivalence, fully cognitively equivalent.  
 
This perhaps initially surprising result is in fact easily proved: 
1. The claim that the full ‘cognitive content’ of a theory T is captured by its Ramsey 
sentence R(T) is a defining characteristic of structural realism - at least as Poincaré, 
Zahar and myself have understood it.18 
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2. R(T), by construction, is expressed purely in the observation language (all the 
theoretical predicates having been ‘quantified away’). 
3.  Moreover R(T) is of course a (second-order) deductive consequence of T. 
4. Hence any two theories that have the same set of empirical consequences (remember 
all consequences expressible in purely observational vocabulary) automatically entail 
equivalent Ramsey sentences and are therefore, according to the claim in 1, 
cognitively equivalent. 
 
Premises 2 and 3 of this argument are trivial (3 is directly underwritten by the second-order 
version of the rule of existential generalisation, but if you prefer first order logic, just assume 
first order set theory and identify properties with sets); and the inference from premises 1, 2 
and 3 to the conclusion at 4 is valid. The only part of the argument that can be questioned, 
therefore, is premise 1.   
 
The detailed defence of this premise, as being both characteristic of structural realism and the 
only sustainable view, is developed in a separate paper (Worrall [forthcoming]) that 
investigates (and rebuts) the so-called ‘Newman Objection’ to structural realism. But let me 
briefly outline the argument here, lest the premise’s claim appear absurd. 
 
At least as far as theoretical talk in science is concerned we are, I suggest, stuck with ‘global 
descriptivism’ and obviously so: all of our knowledge of electrons, protons, gluons and the 
rest of the rich stock of theoretical notions in current science is through description.  To 
suggest anything else would be to indulge in clearly fantastical talk about being able to ‘stand 
outside’ the whole of our knowledge, and have some non-theory-mediated access to the world 
– one that allows us to compare the things that we thus extra-linguistically apprehend with our 
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linguistically-formulated theories about them.  (An apparently different alternative would be 
to invoke one version or other of the ‘causal theory of reference’ but, so I argue in 
[forthcoming], either this accepts that our knowledge of causes too is theoretical (in which 
case the causal theory of reference is ‘just more theory’ and so disguised descriptivism) or it 
is a disguised version of the above fantasy, essentially relying on some mystical ‘semantic 
glue’ between theoretical terms and theoretical entities and on our somehow being able to 
‘apprehend’ that glue.)  But if all our knowledge of theoretical entities is descriptive, then it 
follows that if you are asked what, say, the term ‘gluon’ refers to all you can do is reiterate 
our current best (total!) theories of gluons: that is, a gluon is a ‘whatever it is’ that structures 
the phenomena in certain complex ways through specific intricate relationships with the 
phenomena and with other, similarly characterised, theoretical notions. This characterisation, 
however, is just an informal statement of the Ramsey sentence for our theory of gluons, in 
which the theoretical predicates have been replaced by second-order quantifiers.  (The 
primitive theoretical predicates in the initial un-Ramseyfied theory name (or attempt to name) 
theoretical entities in the same way that the ambiguous names involved in some systems of 
predicate logic do – that is, not directly in the way that we think of regular individual 
constants naming individuals but through the sentences we assert using them. And of course 
in such systems of first order logic, where α is any ambiguous name, Pα and ∃xPx are inter-
derivable and so ‘cognitively equivalent’.) 
 
In other words, once you have accepted global descriptivism concerning all our theoretical 
notions then, as Russell and Poincaré both clearly saw, you have automatically accepted the 
‘Ramsey view’ that the full cognitive content of a theory is captured by its Ramsey sentence.  
To claim that we have epistemic access to something beyond R(T) would, in Russellian terms, 
involve the claim that we have some sort of acquaintance with the theoretical notions 
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designated by the theoretical terms – and this is just a version of the ‘out of theory’ fantasy 
identified above. 
 
There is one response to this argument that is given so often that I ought to at least indicate 
here how to deal with it (though again details will be found in Worrall [forthcoming]). This 
response is that it is no news that once you have adopted the ‘Ramsey view’ there is no 
problem of underdetermination; because adopting that view is in effect to reject realism in 
favour of an empiricist, instrumentalist view of theories; and nobody, of course, ever believed 
that there is a problem of underdetermination if you are an instrumentalist. If structural 
realism is committed to the ‘Ramsey view’ then it is not really realism, and so it is no wonder 
that it does not face the problem of underdetermination -  that problem arises only for real 
realism.19   
 
Well, structural realism is certainly committed in a sense to the claim that there is no 
difference without an observable difference – since it holds that the Ramsey sentence of any 
theory carries its full ‘cognitive’ content and that Ramsey sentence is itself purely, by 
construction, in the observation language. And this might suggest to the unwary that it does 
indeed collapse into some form of instrumentalism or positivism. But to follow that 
suggestion would again be to fail to recognise the data equivalence/ empirical equivalence 
distinction articulated above.  Structural realism is not committed, via its acceptance of the 
‘Ramsey view’, to regarding, for example, Copernican and Ptolemaic theory as ‘cognitively 
equivalent’ at the time of Copernicus (even on the counterfactual supposition that the only 
evidence ever available will be that available to Copernicus).  The notion of ‘no observable 
difference’, when understood as meaning no difference over any sentence expressible in the 
observation language, is an extremely powerful one, as I have tried to demonstrate. Many 
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sentences expressed purely in observational vocabulary should count as theoretical in 
anyone’s book. Hence if two ‘different’ theories are observationally equivalent then they will, 
in general, agree on much that is clearly theoretical. 
 
Along the same lines, it might seem tempting to infer that by quantifying over theoretical 
terms, the Ramsey sentence must eliminate the ‘real’ theoretical content of its parent theory. 
But surely to stand ready to assert a sentence that quantifies over theoretical terms involves 
asserting (not denying) their existence. (This is just a second-order mirroring of Quine 1961 
on ontological commitment.)  And I have argued that, whatever your position on the 
realism/anti-realism issue, you just have to accept that some sentences expressed in purely 
observational vocabulary are theoretical – the Ramsey sentence of any complex scientific 
theory is a prime example.  Carl Hempel, indeed, already made it clear in the ‘Theoretician’s 
Dilemma’ that the Ramsey sentence does not ‘do away with’ theoretical notions.  Hempel, 
recall, was attempting to find a way of eliminating theoretical terms – as a means of resolving 
the theoretician’s dilemma. He notes that some philosophers have thought that Ramsey-fying 
provides exactly such a way, but emphatically rejects their view (op. cit. p.216): 
 
“... the Ramsey-sentence associated with an interpreted theory T avoids reference to 
hypothetical entities only in letter – replacing Latin constants by Greek variables – rather 
than in spirit. For it still asserts the existence of certain entities of the kind postulated by 
T, without guaranteeing any more than does T that those entities are observable or at 
least fully characterizable in terms of observables. Hence, Ramsey-sentences provide no 
satisfactory way of avoiding theoretical entities.” 
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Bad news for Hempel, since it means that Ramsey sentences fail to resolve his ‘dilemma’, but 
good news for those of us who accept that Ramsey sentences capture the full cognitive 
content of scientific theories but still insist on being counted as realists about such 
(successful) theories.  .  To accept, as structural realism does, that a theory in effect ‘reduces’ 
to (that is, carries no further epistemically accessible content than)20 its Ramsey sentence is 
not to ‘eliminate’ theory. And hence to endorse the claims of the Ramsey sentences of our 
currently accepted theories to reflect the theoretically-described ‘deep structure’ of the 
universe is to advocate a version of scientific realism. Indeed it is to advocate what is, in my 
view, the only tenable version of scientific realism.  Only those who assert that any two data 
equivalent theories are cognitively equivalent have abandoned realism for anti-realism. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Like Laudan and Leplin, though for notably different reasons as we have seen, I have argued 
that the alleged threat to orthodox epistemologies and in particular to scientific realism from 
‘underdetermination’ has (to put it conservatively) yet to be substantiated.  As pointed out in 
section 3, Duhem already showed that theoretical systems based on rival core theories can 
always be developed that are data equivalent. But, as Duhem himself suggested  - Duhemian 
‘natural classifications’ proclaim themselves by being genuinely and successfully predictive -  
and has been developed in detail in other more recent accounts of confirmation, it by no 
means follows that theoretical systems based on rival core theories can always be developed 
that are equally ‘empirically successful’ or equally empirically supported. There may be - 
indeed there standardly are - good empirical reasons for preferring one of two data equivalent 
theoretical systems to the other. 
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In section 4, I showed that quite different considerations apply to the notion of empirical 
equivalence – which has not been sufficiently clearly differentiated from data equivalence in 
the literature.  According to at least one version of scientific realism – the one that seems to 
me most (indeed uniquely) defensible – there is no threat at all from the possibility of theories 
‘rival’ to accepted ones that are empirically equivalent to them. This is because structural 
realism entails that there is no effective difference between two such ‘rivals’. According to 
structural realism (and now definitely contrary to Laudan and Leplin), there can indeed be no 
empirical reason to prefer one of two ‘rival’ theories that are empirically equivalent in the 
sense discussed; but this is because there is no significant difference between them - they are 
not genuinely rivals. 
 
There may be other accounts of what it takes for two ‘significantly different’ theories to 
‘share the same empirical success’ but unless and until one such is developed it seems that 
scientific realism has nothing to fear from ‘underdetermination’. 
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Endnotes 
 
1
 This section was motivated by a brief discussion at the BSPS 2008 Annual Conference in St Andrews with 
Branden Fitelson  - my thanks to him for making me face up to the problem dealt with in this section more 
directly than I had done before. 
2
 See Kuhn 1957 [1985], Chapter 5 and Technical Appendix ; and Lakatos and Zahar 1976 
3
 One of the currently favoured approaches toward developing such a unified account is M theory. 
4
 Accepting a theory is, as has often been pointed out, partly a question of deciding to dedicate one’s efforts to 
working on it; but clearly this pragmatic element is not self-standing 
5
 Laudan 1981. 
6
 See my (2000) criticism of Peter Lipton’s (2000). 
7
 This is what is correct about Kitcher (1993) and Psillos’s (1999, 2004) ‘selective (or ‘partial’) realism’ but, 
aside from the fact that they provide no satisfactory demarcation between ‘working’ and merely ‘idle posits’ 
within a theory,  they do not take on board the fact that the parts of theories that are preserved in ‘revolutions’ 
are preserved only structurally. Their selective realism is an addendum to structural realism not a rival to it. 
8
 Van Fraassen 1980, ch. 3. 
9
 Worrall 2006 
10
 Lakatos 1970 and Lakatos and Zahar 1976 
11
 See Kuhn op cit, chapter 5 
12
 Worrall 2003 
13
 Of course, Laudan and Leplin, like everyone else, are aware that, at least if ordinary usage is our guide, the 
distinction between theory and observation – and hence the division into theoretical and observational 
vocabulary - is extraordinarily vague. (Indeed they explicitly attempt to exploit this vagueness in arguing for one 
of their central theses). But obviously some such distinction must be presupposed in order even to raise the 
underdetermination issue: if there is no distinction between statements about data and theoretical claims, then the 
question of whether or not theories are ‘underdetermined by data’ cannot even be raised. For the purposes of the 
present paper we can operate, as Laudan and Leplin implicitly do, with some intuitive distinction that yields 
gluons, quarks, electrons, spacetime curvatures, and light waves, for example, as theoretical, and planets, people, 
tracks on cloud chamber photographs, and interference fringes, for  example, as observable. 
14
 I think I learnt it as an undergraduate from a lecture by Imre Lakatos. 
15
 See Worrall and Zahar 2001 
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16
 At least the ‘pure’ corpuscular theory denies it. It says that light consists simply of particles subject to a variety 
of forces. There were versions of the theory - such as the one that Newton himself seems clearly to have believed 
while explicitly denying that he did – that stated that, while the light emitted by sources such as the sun consisted 
only of particles, those particles then moved through a medium and created waves in it which played a role in 
optical phenomena such as that of Newton’s rings. (For references see Worrall 2001) 
17
 Worrall 1989 and forthcoming 
18
 Russell too, on my understanding of him, but for a dissenting opinion see Votsis 2005. 
19
 See for example Psillos 1999, ch. 7. 
20
 Of course the Ramsey sentence is logically distinct from its ‘full’ theory – the theory is strictly logically 
stronger than its Ramsey sentence, but the (surely correct) claim of the (epistemic) structural realist is  there is, 
even in principle, no epistemic difference between. The difference between the two – the so-called Carnap 
sentence – is an in principle entirely untestable, completely metaphysical assertion.  There is no ‘cognitive’ 
difference between a theory and its Ramsey sentence, not simply no difference of any present epistemic moment, 
but none of any conceivable epistemic moment. (See Worrall and Zahar 2001.) 
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